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Resumen 
 
 
En este artículo se propone un modelo de equilibrio parcial para entender el 
comportamiento del mercado del azúcar en Colombia y sus interacciones comerciales con 
la economía norteamericana. Se evalúan los posibles efectos de un TLC con Estados 
Unidos sobre el mercado, al igual que la incidencia de otros factores internos y externos. Se 
prueba que el impacto de un TLC entre Colombia y Estados Unidos depende del balance de 
dos fuerzas contrapuestas: el incremento en la proporción de la cuota que corresponde a las 
exportaciones colombinas, y la baja progresiva que se ha venido presentando en la cuota 
total de la economía norteamericana.  
 
Jel classification: F14, F13, F11, D00. 
Palabras Claves: Mercado el azúcar, comercio internacional, tratado de libre comercio, cuotas de 
importación. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this paper it is proposed a partial equilibrium model for the sugar market of Colombia to 
understand its trade relations with the North-American economy. Te possible effects of a 
Free Trade Agreement and of other internal and external factors are examined modelling 
the functioning of the North-American sugar market. It is proved that the impact of a FTA 
between Colombia and the USA depend of two forces: the impact of the increase in the 
proportion of the quota affecting the Colombian exports, and the effect of progressive 
decreases in the value of the total North-American quota. 
 
Jel classification: F14, F13, F11, D00. 
Keywords: Sugar market, international trade, free trade agreement, import quotas. 
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QUOTAS AND PRICES: MODELLING THE SUGAR MARKET IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
In this paper a partial equilibrium model is used to capture some important features of the 
sugar market in Colombia. This model is partially inspired by the excellent work of Tatiana 
Prada2, in which for simplicity it is assumed that the sugar market is competitive. One of 
the main contributions of the present work is the introduction of the demand-side analysis 
in the model and the connection made with the North American sugar market. To center the 
analysis in the trade of sugar and for simplicity, the impact of the production of ethanol for 
the sugar industry is not considered. Future papers in the field should fill this gap. The 
paper is organised as follows. First, the market is modelled in autarky. This constitutes a 
very simple and ideal approximation, in which the real international context of the market 
is ignored. However it represents a natural point of departure for the analysis. Then, a 
simple model for the USA’s sugar market is presented, as a key piece to explain the 
complete model for the open market in Colombia. Next, the market is modelled in an 
international context including the North American economy and the rest of the world. 
Finally, conclusions are stated. 
 
1. The Model in Autarky 
A. Assumptions 
It is supposed that the sugar market in Colombia is competitive, although the number of 
firms –i.e. sugar mills– (n) is given and small. That is because there are strong barriers to 
the entry of new firms derived, partly because of the difficulty of having large extensions of 
arable land, and partly because of the heavy machinery required to produce sugar. As soon 
as the marginal cost curve is always over the average cost curve, firms will obtain positive 
profits. Following Prada (2004) it is supposed that the technology of the typical sugar mill 
is given by a quasi-fixed factor function as bellow 
( ) ;,min ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= iii KfHq λ  ( ) ,βα ii KKf =  ,10 ≤≤ β  ,0>α                    (1) 
where iq  is the quantity of sugar produced by the sugar mill i, iH  is the quantity of sugar 
cane used in the milling, iK  denotes the quantity of a compound factor including capital 
and labor, ,λ  the technical coefficient, measures the quantity of sugar cane required to 
produce one unit of sugar, and α  and ,β  the parameters associated to the compound 
factor, explain the concavity of the function. 
 
The final consumers of sugar have quasi-lineal preferences of the type 
,qy)q,y(U
d
ddd
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+=
−
θγ
θ
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 ,, 00 >> θγ                               (2) 
                                                 
2  See Prada (2004) 
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where dy  represents the quantities of a compound Hicks-Marshall good (the rest of the 
goods) that a representative agent consumes, dq  indicates the quantities of sugar that he 
demands, γ  is a parameter capturing the bias in the expenditures of ,dq  and θ  is a 
parameter related to the price-elasticity in the demand for sugar; indeed 11 <= θε p  
corresponds to this elasticity (at an individual and an aggregate level), so that it is supposed 
that the demand for sugar is inelastic in prices. This is reasonable when speaking of a basic 
good. Many empirical works for different countries have proved that the demand for sugar 
tends to be inelastic in prices3. There are two types of consumers: Type 1 consumers who 
have low levels of income and type 2 consumers who have high levels of income. So that, 
the total number of consumers (the total population )(N  can be divided between these two 
types 
21 NNN +=                                                     (3) 
Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the sugar market is given by 
,qNqNnq ddi 2211 +=                                               (4) 
where dq1  y 
dq2  are the quantities of sugar demanded for the type 1 consumers and the type 
2 respectively. The right side of (4) represents the aggregate demand of sugar, and the left 
side represents the aggregate supply.  
 
B. Production 
Given the technology of quasi-fixed factors the total cost function of the firm is given by 
,qrqR)q(C iii
β
αλ
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+=                                          (5) 
where R represents the price of the sugar cane and r the price of the compound input. It can 
be proved that the average cost function is always under the marginal cost function except 
of the origin, where the two curves coincide. That is because of the concave form in which 
the compound factor enters into the production function. Consequently, the problem of the 
typical firm is  
).q(Cpqmax iiiqi
−=∏                                             (6) 
The price policy of the firm implies that in the optimum 
( ) ;qrRp i 111 −− ⋅⋅+= ββαβλ                                      (7) 
Hence the supply curve of the firm is  
( ) ( )[ ] ,Rp/)p(q )/(/i βββ λαλβ −−= 11                                     (8) 
an increasing concave function of ,iq  that is positive if and only if .λRp >  
In equilibrium the profit function of the firm is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ;Rpr)p(i 01 11 >−−=∏ −ββ λαββ                           (9) 
It is an increasing-concave function of the market price. 
 
                                                 
3 For the estimation of demand price-elasticity in USA see for example the classic work Tanner (1994). 
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C. Demand  
The problem to be solved by the representative consumer is 
           ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+=
−
θγ
θ
1
11dddd
y,q
qy)y,q(Umax
dd  
,Iqpy.a.s dd =⋅+  
where I denotes the income of the representative consumer. Due to the linear component of 
the utility function, a classical optimization to solve this problem can not be used, because 
it can be obtained corner solutions. Instead, it can be used the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:  
,pq 0≤− λγ θ            0≥dq                                     (10) 
,01 ≤− λ            0≥dy                                   (11) 
,qpyI dd 0≥⋅+−      ,0≥λ                                  (12) 
in each case with complementary slackness. With two non negative variables and one 
restriction of inequality, there are 8 possible patterns of equations and inequalities. 
Nonetheless, it can be proved that there are only two types of solutions: 
 
                             Type 1: ,PIqd 1=  0=dy  if θθγ 111 −≤ pI                      (13) 
                       Type 2: ,11 θθγ −= pqd  θθγ 1112 −−= pIyd  if ,111 θθγ −> pI  (14) 
where the index for the variable of income denotes the type of consumer. The first type 
corresponds to a group of consumers with relatively low income. They are poor people, 
who spent their budget for basic needs4 –mainly sugar or other similar goods which provide 
sufficient amount of calories to survive–, because they need calories to survive. For them 
.111 θθγ −≤ pI  The second type corresponds to another group of consumers with relatively 
high income. It is shown in the equation (14), they consume positive quantities of both 
goods.  
 
D. Market Equilibrium in autarky  
With (13) and (14) the aggregate demand for sugar is given by ( ) ( );pNpIN)p(D θθγ 11211 −⋅+=                              (15) 
It can be proved that with inelastic individual demands, the aggregate demand for sugar is 
also inelastic. From (13) and (14) in (4) we have  
      ( ) ( );pNpINnq)p(S i θθγ 11211 −⋅+=≡  
using (8) gives  
      ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ),pNpINRp/n )/(/ θθβββ γλαλβ 1121111 −− ⋅+=−⋅  
that can be written as 
      ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )( ),ppINRp/n )/(/ θθβββ γρρλαλβ 11111 1 −− ⋅−+=−⋅           (16) 
                                                 
4 Type 1 consumers include the workers of the sugar industry, who have low levels of income in Colombia.  
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where ρ  is the fraction of consumers with low income and ρ−1  the fraction with high 
income. By using implicit derivation, can be better understood the behaviour of the sugar 
market in autarky. Graphically 
 
Chart No 1: The Sugar Market in Autarky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Some Results 
Firstly, it can be proved that positive changes in population lead to increases in the 
equilibrium market price (for (16)) and, therefore, in the quantity of sugar traded in the 
market, because the population growth shifts the demand curve upwards. 
 
Secondly, as expected, it can be proved that more firms lead to lower prices and increases 
in the equilibrium quantities of sugar traded, since it shifts the supply curve downwards. 
So, the more firms in the market are, the less production by ach firms due to decreases in 
prices (see (8)), but this effect is overwhelmed in the aggregate.  
 
Thirdly, an increase in the fraction of consumers with low incomes drops the price sugar of 
equilibrium, because, although these consumers do not demand the other good, the positive 
impact they cause in the demand for sugar is slighter than that of the other group of 
consumers. Remember that hypothetically θθγ 1111 −≤ pI  and ,1112 θθγ −> pI  so that 
.12 II >  
 
Fourthly, evidently increases in the type 1 consumer’s income, ceteris paribus make the 
demand for sugar shift upwards implying a higher demand for sugar, and therefore higher 
prices. 
 
Finally, one increase in the bias of expenditures of dq  )(γ  leads to higher prices as well, 
due to the rising demand for sugar. 
 
0
)p(D
p
1
( )( )θγρρ 11 1−+IN
)(S ρ
inqQ =
λR
0Q
0p
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Hence, from the implicit function theorem it can be defined the following implicit function 
for p 
),I,,n,N(pp γρ 1= ; ,dN
dp 0> ,
dn
dp 0<  ,d
dp 0<ρ  ,dI
dp 0
1
< and .d
dp 0>γ               (17) 
F. One Special Case 
With perfect complement factors the total cost function become linear –the technology 
became a Leontief production function–, in which the marginal cost is given by .αλ
rR +  
Consequently, the market equilibrium implies that for a specific number of firms, n, the 
price must equal the marginal cost. Hence the equilibrium quantity of sugar depends on the 
demand exclusively, and the firms obtain zero profits. Graphically 
 
 
 
 
Chart No 2: The Market in Autarky with Perfect Complement Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case the market equilibrium is given by  
( ) ,rRrRINnqi ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅=⋅
−− θ
θ
αλγραλρ
1
1
1
1 1  
Solving for iq  gives  
( ) ,rRrRI
n
Nqi ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅=
−− θ
θ
αλγραλρ
1
1
1
1 1                   (16’) 
 
So that, though equilibrium quantities are not affected by supply factors, it depends on the 
demand factors in the same way as the general case with quasi-fixed factor’s technology. It 
is worth to be mentioned that n has a negative impact on the firm’s supply, however it does 
not affect the aggregate supply. 
 
 
 
0
)p(D
0Q
inqQ =
αλ
rRp +=0
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2. The Sugar Market in the USA 
USA is a net importer of sugar. Generally the internal price there, *p , is lower than the 
international price, .Ip  The North American sugar policy is based on a system of quotas 
and a Sugar Loan Program (SLP) for the maintaining of prices (Beguin et al. 2001). 
Therefore, the relevant internal price is not the market price but the quota’s price. 
Furthermore, there is established a minimum price ( )*minp  below from which the quota price 
shouldn’t fall. So that, if eventually the quota price ( )*cp  were lower than the minimum, the 
government should have to finance the losses in profits for the firms –which are ( ) ( ))p(q)p(qp)p(qpp *c*i*min*i*c*min*i*c*min −⋅+⋅− – through the SLP.  
 
A. Assumptions 
Due to the less available land and the worse climate conditions, it is supposed that there are 
strong decreasing returns to scale in the production of sugar and production technology is 
given by a Cobb-Douglas function as follows 
,KHq b*i
a*
i
*
i =                                                   (18) 
where ,10 << a  ,10 << b  and .1<+ ba  Indeed, as the decreasing returns to scale are 
strong, it is useful to assume that .5.0<+ ba  Here *iH  represents the quantity of red beet, 
corn, or sugar cane, and *iK  indicates the quantity of a compound factor –analogous to that 
for the domestic firms– used by a representative firm or sugar mill. It is worth noting that 
this technology is more flexible than the one for the domestic economy, because there is a 
moderate degree of substitution between the two factors of production –i. e. the elasticity of 
substitution between them is 1–. This makes sense, if we take into account the frequent 
technological advances in the North American agriculture. 
 
North American consumers have identical preferences to the domestic consumers, therefore 
we have  
,qy)q,y(U
d*
d*d*d* ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+=
−
θγ
θ
1
1
1
 ,, 00 >> θγ                            (19) 
Nevertheless, in this country all the consumers have a relatively high rent. Consequently 
there is just one group of consumers: II type consumers.  
 
The market equilibrium is given by  
,qNMqn d****i
* =+                                                (20) 
where *M  indicates the imports of sugar in the North American Economy, *n  is the total 
number of firms, that is suppose to be given, and *N  the total number of consumers. 
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B. Production 
From (18) by minimizing costs, the total cost function of the typical firm can be deduced as  
,q)q(c ba*i
*
i
+=
1μ                                                    (21) 
where ,rRb
a
b
a
ba
b
*ba
a
*ba
a
ba
b
++
+−+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛≡μ  *R  is the price of the red beets, the corn or the 
sugar cane in the USA. This is a convex function. The average cost function is a convex 
function of 
*
iq  too. Moreover, it can be proved that the marginal cost function is always 
above the average cost function, implying firms to obtain positive profits. The first order 
condition for the maximization of firm’s profits enables us to get the supply curve of the 
typical firm: 
,p)p(q ba
ba
****
i
−−
+
= 1μ                                              (22) 
a concave function of p, where .ba
ba
ba
*
−−
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +≡ 1μμ  The price elasticity for the supply of 
each firm is given by  
,
1
*
ba
ba
ip −−
+=η                                               (23) 
which is lower than one and positive by the assumptions of the model. 
The aggregate supply curve is 
.pn)p(qnS ba
ba
*****
i
** −−
+
=≡ 1μ                                    (24) 
So that, the price elasticity for the aggregate supply curve equals the price elasticity for the 
individual supply curve. 
,
ba
ba*
p −−
+=
1
η                                              (25) 
C. Demand 
The problem to be resolved by the representative consumer in the North American 
economy is 
           ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+=
−
θγ
θ
1
1
1d*
d*d*d*
y,q
qy)y,q(Umax
dd   
,Iqpy.a.s *d**d* =⋅+  
where *I  represents the income of the representative consumer and 1>θ  is a parameter 
related to the price elasticity for the consumption of sugar. Using The Kuhn-Tucker 
Theorem and noting that all the North American consumers have a relatively high rent, so 
that ,11*1* θθγ −> pI  we have 
,pq *d* θθγ 11 −=  θθγ 1112 −−= *d pIy                                (26) 
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Therefore the aggregate demand curve for sugar is  
θθγ 11 −⋅=≡ *d*** pNqN)p(D                                  (27) 
It can be proved that the price elasticity of aggregate demand, likewise the price elasticity 
of the individual demand, is .1
1
* <= θpε  
 
D. Market Equilibrium in Autarky in the USA 
By making 0* =M  in (20) and replacing (24) and (27) we have 
;pNpn **ba
ba
*** θθγμ 111 −−−+ ⋅=                                   (28) 
Solving for *p  gives 
( )
( )( )( )11
1
10
−+−
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ba
ba
*
**
*
N
np
θ
θ
θγ
μ                                    (29) 
Replacing in (8) it turns out 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )( )11
1
11
1
00
−+−
+
−−+
−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ba
ba
*
*
ba
ba
***
N
n)p(q
θ
θ
θθ γμ                         (30) 
Furthermore, it can be proved that the firm’s profits are positive in equilibrium and equal to  
( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ,01111*
*
11
11
*
0 >+−⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∏ −+−−−+
−+−
ba
N
n ba
ba
ba
i
θ
θ
θθ
θ
γμ  since .21<+ ba  
Graphically 
Chart No 3: USA’s Sugar Market in Autarky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Some Results 
An increase in the amount of firms reduces the equilibrium price because it shifts the 
aggregate supply curve downwards as shows (30), although it leads to a decrease in the 
supply of the individual firm. As a result of that, the more is the competition among firms, 
the less are their profits.  
 
0
)p(D*
*p
1
)(S * ρ
*
i
* nqQ =θγ 1 0Q
0p
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On the other hand, increases in the number of consumers lead to higher prices and greater 
sales of sugar in equilibrium (see equations (29) and (30)), since it shifts the aggregate 
demand upwards. The profits of the firms tend to grow, as more quantities of sugar are sold 
by each firm. 
 
Finally, increases in the bias on the expenditures of sugar have the same impact as the 
increases in the number of consumers, because it affects the demand positively. 
 
F. International Trade and Trade Policy 
In this section the USA’s sugar market is opened. Generally the international price is lower 
than the domestic price, so that .*pp I <  As a result of U.S. intervention policies, sugar 
prices in the United States were historically higher than in the rest of the world (Heboyan et 
al 2001, 4). Nonetheless Tariffs fixed by the North American government are not 
considered for simplicity.  
 
Free Trade 
Given the assumption above the free trade market equilibrium requires that  
,qNM)p(qn d***I*i
* =+                                           (30) 
with (22) and (27) evaluating in Ip  and solving for ,*M  we have the import function of 
sugar for the USA. 
.pnpN)p(M ba
ba
I**I*I* −−
+− −= 111 μγ θθ                                (31) 
Without doubt this is a decreasing function of the international sugar price. It can be proved 
that the profits of the firms are positive in free trade an equal to  
( )( ) ( )( ) ,bap)p( baI*Ii 011 10 >+−⋅=∏ +−μ                              (32) 
It can be assumed that the world exports of sugar are an increasing function of the 
international price of sugar and of the out of the quota’s North-American exports. That is 
because the North-American economy acts as a big economy. However, this curve is not 
modelled and Ip  is treated as given so far. 
 
Import Quotas 
The North-American government establishes an import quota in order to reach a higher 
production of sugar and to maintain a higher price than the international one. The amount 
of the quota, ,*cM  is supposed to be given. The quota equilibrium can be obtained 
substituting *cM  into (31). We get  
.pnpNM ba
ba
*
c
***
c
**
c
−−
+− −= 111 μγ θθ                           (33) 
Even though it is impossible to clear ,p*c  it can be analysed implicitly. By using the 
implicit function theorem, it can be proved the following: 
 
First, a lower quota level leads to a higher quota price, because the pre-existent demand 
excess pushes the price upwards until reducing it to the new level of the quota imposed. 
                                                Quotas and prices: modelling the sugar market in Colombia  10 
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Second, given the level of the quota, a growing total population implies a higher quota 
price, because it leads to a larger level of demand and, consequently, to a higher potential 
demand excess.  
 
At last, more firms (a higher *n ) generate a larger aggregate supply and, this way, a lower 
level of potential demand excess. Since the level of the quota is given, the quota price tends 
to fall until the new position of the aggregate supply curve is matched to the pre-established 
level of the quota. The opposite happens with a higher ,γ  because it pushes the demand 
upwards. 
 
Taking into account the latter, and by using the implicit function theorem, we can define an 
implicit function for p with respect to *cM , ,
*N *n  y .γ  This function is written as 
),,,( ***** γnNMpp ccc = ; ,0*
*
<
c
c
dM
dp ,0*
*
>
dN
dpc ,0*
*
<
dn
dpc  y .0
*
>γd
dpc         (34) 
The profits of the sugar mills are higher with the quota, because the quota price is higher 
than the market price. These are  
( )( ) ( )( ) ,01)( 1 1***0 >+−⋅=∏ +− bapp bacci μ                             (35) 
 
It can be proved that the elasticity of the quota price with respect to its level is given by 
.0
1
*
*
***11*
**11*
*
*
*
*
>⋅⋅+⋅
⋅⋅−⋅==⋅− −
−
ip
ip
c
cipc
cc
pM
c
c
c
c
pnpN
pnpN
p
M
dM
dp
ηθθ
ηθθ
μηγθ
μγε                  (36) 
This elasticity is lower than 1 for not too large values of .θ   
 
 
3. Bilateral Trade between Colombia and the USA 
 
A. Production 
The domestic economy costs are given by equation (5) 
,)(
1 β
αλ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+= iii qrqRqC  
The domestic market is now opened to the North-American economy and the rest of the 
world. The imports of the domestic economy are not considered for simplicity and because 
they are less important than the exports in quantitative terms. The problem to solve for the 
representative domestic firm is now 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,1max 1*** βαλφφ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−−⋅+−⋅−+−⋅=∏ iiiciiIiiiq qrqRxpxqpxqpii               (37) 
where iq  is the total production of sugar of the representative firm; 
*
ix  are the domestic 
quota-exports to the USA; while φ  is the fraction of the out of quota production sold by 
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each firm on the internal market of sugar, φ−1  is the fraction sold by each firm abroad. 
These fractions are supposed to be given for a representative firm5. 
Since only a fraction of the North-American quota is assigned to the domestic exports, the 
per firm exports of sugar from Colombia can be written as a function of the total quota in 
the USA and n; these are 
,
*
*
n
Mx ci
ψ=                                                      (38) 
where ψ  is the fraction of the total quota corresponding to the Colombian economy.  
As cM  and ψ  are policy variables for the North-American economy, they could not be 
choice variables for the domestic firms. Therefore, they are considered as given as same as 
prices. Firstly, as the firms are price takers, the domestic (internal) price is supposed to be 
given for them. Secondly, as stated above, the quota price in the USA is an inverse function 
of the level of the quota in this country (see equations (34) and (36)). Thirdly, the 
international price is determined abroad. It positively depends on the level of the total quota 
because this latter determines the level of the North-American exports, which has some 
influence on the level of the international supply of sugar. A lower level of quota induces a 
higher supply of sugar in the North-American sugar mills, and so a higher level of exports 
from this country to the rest of the world. Since the USA plays as a big country in the world 
sugar market, a higher level of their exports shifts the world supply of sugar downwards, 
giving a negative impact on the international price; the opposite happens when the level of 
the quota grows. So that we have  
)( *cII Mpp = ; 0)( * >′ cI Mp                                   (39) 
Many works like Tanner (1994) have given conclusive empirical support of this 
phenomenon since many years. 
 
During the years 1986-1988, the internal production of sugar (in USA) grew. Consequently, the 
sugar quota –in absolute terms, as a percentage of the internal production, and as a percentage of the 
internal commercialization– decreased dramatically. ... Since these years were characterized by low 
international prices of sugar, and not by an extraordinary high production, it could be thought that 
the decrease of the North-American quota contributed to the movements in the world price of sugar 
(Tanner Op. cit, 96)6. 
 
Hence the quota-elasticity of the international price should be positive but not larger than 1, 
because, although USA is one of the principal producers of sugar in the world, their exports 
only represent a relatively small fraction of the total exports of the world. For example, in 
2008 they represented only a level of 4,6% of the total world production of sugar 
                                                 
5 A more realistic model should endogenize φ  in function of the particularities of each firm and the functioning of the 
Sugar Price Stabilization Fund. Nonetheless in this model it is supposed for simplicity that all the domestic firms are 
identical. In Prada (2004) the same parameter is treated as exogenously given too. However, Prada omits the fact that with 
the definition of φ , the domestic sales are not given by Qφ  but for ( )USAQQ −φ  (in her own notation), to the extend 
that USAQ  enters in the total cost function as a part of .Q  
6 Translated by the autor. 
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(ASOCAÑA 2009). This elasticity can be expressed as .
I
c
c
I
p
M
dM
dp=ξ  So the problem of 
the typical firm can be rewritten as  
( ) ,1max 1*** βαλ
ψψφψφ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⋅+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∏ iiccciIciiq
qrqR
n
Mp
n
Mqp
n
Mqp
ii
 (40) 
The first order condition to the solution of this problem is given by 
( ) ( ) ,01 111 =⋅−−−+=∂
∏∂ − ββ αβλφφ iI
i
i qrRpp
q
                         (41) 
so that                                ( ) ( ) ;1 111 ββ αβλφφ −⋅+=−+ iI qrRpp                            (42) 
The left side of this equation can be interpreted as a proxy of the weighted average price 
corresponding to the Sugar Price Stabilization Fund (SPSF)7. This price can be denoted as ( ) pppp I =−+ φφ 1                                              (43) 
Hence, the total supply function of sugar of the typical firm is 
( ) ( )[ ] ,/)( )1/(/1 βββ λαβ −−= Rpprppqi                               (44) 
an increasing-concave function of p, ,Ip  and pp. The profit function of the firm is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ;01)( *11 >−+−−=∏ −
n
MpppRpprpp cci
ψλαββ ββ              (45) 
an increasing-concave function of p, ,Ip  and pp too. With some algebra it can be proved 
that 
.0
*
>
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=∏
n
Mq
dp
d c
i
i ψφ                                        (46) 
This expression is positive because 
n
M c
*ψ
 represents only a fraction of .iq  
 
B. Demand 
As defined above the aggregate demand of the domestic consumers is given by ( ) ( );)( 11211 θθγ −⋅+= pNpINpD  
 
C. Market Equilibrium  
The equilibrium condition requires the aggregate supply to be equal to the internal demand 
plus the exports; 
.)()( XpDppnqi +=                                              (47) 
 
The demand of exports can be written as partly North-American quota and partly the 
demand of the rest of the world, that is  
,XMX Ii
*
c +=ψ                                                   (48) 
                                                 
7 See Prada (2004) for a complete explanation of the working of this system. 
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where IiX  are the demand of exports from the rest of the world (including the out of quota 
North-American exports), which are considered exogenous. 
From (48) in (47), recalling (44), and the aggregate demand function, the model can be 
closed in p. 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )( ) .1/ *111)1/(/1 Iic XMppINRppn ++⋅−+=−⋅ −− ψγρρλαλβ θθβββ  (49) 
This is a non linear function in p, whose analytical solution is impossible to find. But it can 
be analysed implicitly. Be ( ) 0, ≡⋅pG  the following general function in p and the rest of 
exogenous variables and parameters of the model 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) 01/, *111)1/(/1 ≡−−⋅−−−−=⋅ −− Iic XMppIRppNnpG ψγρρλαλβ θθβββ  
(50) 
D. Results 
The effect of changes in N, n, ,ρ  ,1I  and γ  on p is the same as in a closed economy. This 
was already explained in 1.E. Changes in these variables affect the profits of the firms only 
indirectly by changing prices. Therefore, as increases in L and in γ  generate more profits, 
increases in n or in ρ  have contrary effects.  
 
Likewise, it is important to explain the effect of changes in the variables related to the 
external factors, ,ψ  ,*cM  and ,IiX which are the key factors in the FTA negotiation 
between Colombia and the United States. 
 
Firstly, consider the effect of changes in ,ψ  the proportion of the total North-American 
quota oriented to the Colombian exports. By using the implicit function theorem, it can be 
proved that increases (decreases) in ψ  unambiguously lead to increases (decreases) in the 
price of sugar, because they have strong positive (negative) effect on the aggregate demand 
of sugar. In order to understand how changes in ψ  affect the profits of the firms is good to 
consider that it has both a direct and an indirect effect through the changes in the price. The 
total derivative of the profits of the firms with respect to the changes in ψ  is given by  
,ψψψ ∂
∏∂+⋅∏=∏ iii
d
dp
dp
d
d
d
                                             (51) 
where ( ) .0** >−+
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=∏
n
Mppp
d
dp
n
Mq
d
d c
c
c
i
i
ψ
ψφψ                           (51’) 
The above formula (51’) is positive, because 
dp
d i∏ and ψd
dp  are positive, and the quota 
price is always higher than the weighted average price. Therefore, as expected, increases in 
the proportion of the quota assigned to the Colombian exports generate extra profits to the 
domestic firms. 
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Secondly, consider the effect of changes in ,*cM  the amount of the total quota of the North-
American Economy. It can be proved that for low values of β  and ξ  and large values of L 
the effect of changes in *cM  on the price of sugar tend to be positive. Consequently, due to 
the assumptions of the model, *
cdM
dp  should be positive. It means that when ,ξ  the 
elasticity of the international price with respect to the total amount of the North-American 
quota, and the β  coefficient are relatively low and the total population is sufficiently large 
as well, the positive impact of an increase in *cM  on the international price IP  -that 
stimulates the aggregate supply of sugar- is not strong enough to outweigh the positive 
effect that it has in the aggregate demand of sugar. The total impact of changes in the 
amount of the total quota is given by 
.
MdM
dp
dp
d
dM
dp
dp
d
dM
dp
dp
d
dM
d
*
c
i
*
c
*
c
*
c
i
*
c
I
I
i
*
c
i
*
c
i
∂
∏∂+⋅∏+⋅∏+⋅∏=∏              (52) 
It can be proved that                ( ) 01 >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∏
n
Mq
dp
d *c
i
I
i ψφ                                     (53) 
and that  
( ) ;0>−=∂
∏∂
n
ppp
M cc
i ψ                                     (54) 
By using algebra we get  
( )( ) ( )( ).111 ** pppnpepnMqMdMd cpMcpIcicci −−++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∏ εψφξφψ        (55) 
Its sign is ambiguous in principle, although the last term is the only one that could have a 
negative impact. For sufficiently large values of n the whole expression is positive, so that, 
an increase in the level of the quota has a positive impact on profits. It means that the 
positive impact of ,*
c
i
dM
dp
dp
d ⋅∏ *
c
I
I
i
dM
dp
dp
d ⋅∏ and *
c
i
M∂
∏∂
 is not compensated with the 
negative effect of .*
*
*
c
c
c
i
dM
dp
dp
d ⋅∏  
 
Thirdly, using the implicit function theorem it can be proved that an increase in the exports 
of the rest of the world ( )IiX  conduces to an increase in the internal price of sugar, and 
consequently in the domestic supply of sugar. For that, is has a positive impact on the 
profits of the firms. This effect has been very important for the Colombian sugar industry 
during this decade: In particular, it can be checked using descriptive statistics that the 
dramatic fall of the Colombian exports during the last years explain in part the downward 
trend presented in the total supply of sugar during this period. Whereas the total supply of 
sugar fall from 2.741.363 MT in 2004 to 2.036.164 MT in the year 2008, the direct exports 
of sugar decrease more rapidly from 1.232.782 MT in 2004 to 478.442 MT at the end of 
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that period. The other relevant factor explaining this dramatic trend in the supply of sugar is 
the production of ethanol (Raffo 2009). 
 
Finally, it is important to analyse the effect of changes in the fraction of the out of quota 
production, sold by each firm on the internal market of sugar .φ  It can be proved that the 
effect of changes in φ  on the price of the sugar depends on the relative measure of this 
price with respect to the international price of sugar. More precisely, one increase 
(decrease) in φ  tends to a decrease in the internal price of sugar, if and only if, this price is 
higher than the international price, i.e.  
Ippd
dp
>
≤⇔<
≥
0φ                                                  (56) 
That is because an increase (decrease) in φ  has two different effects on the aggregate 
supply of sugar: it increases the supply, as it increases ,pφ  but it decreases the supply, as it 
has a negative impact on ).1( φ−Ip  As ( ) pppp I =−+ φφ 1  for (43), it can be inferred that 
the effect of increases (decreases) in φ  on the price depends on how it alters ,pp  the proxy 
of the weighted average price corresponding to the Sugar Price Stabilization Fund; When 
pp  increases (decreases), a rise (fall) in the aggregate supply of sugar occurs, and hence a 
decrease (an increase) in the internal price of sugar. 
 
With respect to the impact of changes of φ  on the profits, it is important to consider not 
only its direct impact, but also its indirect impact through the price, so that  
.φφφ ∂
∏∂+⋅∏=∏ iii
d
dp
dp
d
d
d                                         (57) 
As the direct impact equals 
,0
*
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∂
∏∂
n
Mqp cii
ψ
φ                                       (58) 
with (46) and (57), by using some algebra we have  
[ ,1* φηψφ pcii nMqpdd +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∏ ]                                   (59) 
when ;0≥φd
dp  or  
[ ,1* φηψφ pcii nMqpdd −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∏ ]                                  (57’) 
when .0<φd
dp  
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Here φη p  denotes the elasticity of the price of sugar with respect to φ : ,
pd
dp φ
φ ⋅  if ,0>φd
dp  
or 
pd
dp φ
φ ⋅−  if .0<φd
dp  In relation to the previous equations, and taking into account (56), it 
is clear that when ,0>φd
dp  the impact of an increase in φ  on the profits is positive, so that 
⇒⋅=
pd
dp
p
φ
φη φ ;0⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ >∏φd
d i                                           (60) 
But when ,0<φd
dp  it depends on its level: on one hand when it is elastic ( 1>φη p ), 
,0<∏φd
d i  because the negative effect on the price is relatively strong, so that it outweighs 
the positive effect of φ∂
∏∂ i
; On the other hand, when it is inelastic ( 1<φη p ), ,0<∏φd
d i  the 
negative effect on the price is relatively weak, to outweigh the positive impact of .
i
φ∂
∏∂
  
In the especial case where the elasticity is one, the negative effect of the price –the first 
term of the right side of (57)– is neutralised by the positive impact of .
i
φ∂
∏∂
 
Therefore  
.10 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
>
≤↔<
≥∏⇒⋅−= φφ ηφ
φ
φη p
i
p d
d
pd
dp                              (61) 
With (56) it follows that  
⇒≤ ppI ;d
d i ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ >∏ 0φ                                         (62) 
when ,pd
dp
p
φ
φη φ ⋅=  and that  
,
d
dpp piI ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
>
≤↔<
≥∏⇒> 10 φηφ                               (63) 
when .pd
dp
p
φ
φη φ ⋅−=  
 
By taking into account the latter results and the implicit function theorem with respect to ( ⋅,pG ) , we can define an implicit function for p with respect to N, n, ,ρ  ,1I  ,γ  ,ψ  ,*cM  
I
iX  and φ :  
),,,,,,,,( *1 φψγρ Iic XMInNpp = ; 
 
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO No. 122 
                                                Quotas and prices: modelling the sugar market in Colombia  18 
 
 
,0>
dN
dp ,0<
dn
dp  ,0<ρd
dp  ,0
1
<
dI
dp  ,0>γd
dp ,0>I
idX
dp ,0>ψd
dp  
0>*
cdM
dp
 for low values of β  and ξ  and large values of L, and .0 Ipp>
≤⇔<
≥
φd
dp  (64) 
 
D) The Impact of a FTA Between Colombia and the USA 
 
The initial purpose of Colombia in the negotiations of the TLC was to enter to the North 
American market with a quantity of 500.000 MT, a quantity considerably higher than the 
currently quota-exports to Colombia. However, after almost 22 months of negotiation 
Colombia only achieved an increase of 50.000 MT of additional exports to the North-
American economy with an annual increase of 1.5% (approximately 750 MT). By contrast, 
the North-American government demanded free entry for his own production of substitutes 
of sugar as the glucose syrup, and, in fact, it was dealt with a tariff liberation for the 
imports of corn syrup during the next 9 years.  
 
Within the OMC distribution of the quota, Colombia had already entered to the North-
American market with 25.000 MT. Even though the share of the Colombian exports in the 
North-American imports is marginal –it represented only 2.3% in 2004– and it has been 
diminishing during the last years (see Table 1), Colombia has been the country with the 
highest quota in the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreements of the USA. 
 
Likewise, the total North American quota has been diminishing too, decreasing from 
2.100.001 MT in 1996/97 to1117192 MT in 2003/04 and to 1.336.736 in 2006/07. This is 
shown in Table 1 too. 
Table 1 
Imports of Raw Sugar of the United States (1996/97-2006/07, MT) 
Origin/Year 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Quota Colombia 48.690 36.593 25.999 25.274 25.274 25.274 
Total quota 2.100.001 1.600.000 1.164.934 1.135.000 1.223.045 1.117.257 
 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
25.273 25.273 30.235 43.121 30.760 25.273 
1.117.192 1.117.192 1.193.801 1.717.150 1.336.736 1.117.192
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
Hence, ceteris paribus the exports of the rest of the world, IiX , the impact of the FTA 
between Colombia and the USA in the next years can be understood as the conjugation of 
two different processes: First, an increase in the share of the Colombian quota in the total 
quota, and second a continuous decrease in the total quota level of the United States. 
 
 
 
CIDSE – Universidad del Valle – Leonardo Raffo López 
So the possible impact of the FTA to the profits of the domestic firms is given by 
ψψ Δ⋅
∏+Δ⋅∏=∏Δ
d
dM
dM
d i
c
c
i
i
*
*                                          (56) 
Due to 0* <Δ cM  and ,0>Δψ  and taking into account (51’) and (55), we can say that the 
possible impact of the FTA is ambiguous: while the first term of the right side of (56) is 
negative, the second term of the right side is positive. From (56) it can be seen that the sign 
of the changes in the profits of the firms depends of how the proportion of Colombian 
exports in the total quota changes as the total North American quota diminishes. If 
0*
*
>⋅Δ
Δ− ψ
ψ c
c
M
M
 is the elasticity of the proportion of the quota that goes to the Colombian 
exports with respect to the total North-American quota we have 
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
c
c
c
c
i
M
M
d
d
M
dM
d
*
*
*
*0 ⋅Δ
Δ−>
≤
∏⋅
∏
∏⋅
∏
⇔<
≥∏Δ                                  (57) 
With (51’) and (55) we have 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
.
11
0 *
*
**
**
ψ
ψ
ψψψ
ψφ
εψφξφψ
c
c
c
cc
i
pMc
c
pI
c
i
i
M
M
ppp
n
M
d
dp
n
Mq
ppp
n
Mpep
n
Mq
c
⋅Δ
Δ−>
≤
−+⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−−++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
⇔<
≥∏Δ  
Hence the FTA would have a positive impact on the profits of the firms, when the 
percentage changes in the proportion of the Colombian exports in the total quota with 
respect to the percentage changes in the total North American quota are relatively small.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The simple model developed here shows that under perfect competition in the North-
American sugar market, the quota price inversely depends on the total level of the quota 
and the number of firms, but directly on the total population and .γ  For this, the profits of 
the North-American firms depend in the same way from on these factors. 
 
Likewise, for the Colombian sugar market, internal factors such as the total domestic 
population, the number of firms and the parameter ,γ  affect the internal price in the same 
way as in the North American Economy with respect to the quota price.  
 
Furthermore, as expected, the model shows that increases in the proportion of the total 
North-American quota assigned to the Colombian exports, lead to increases in the domestic 
price and therefore in the profits of the domestic firms. 
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With respect to the consequences of changes in the level of the total quota, it has been 
shown that under the assumptions of the model, positive (negative) changes in the level of 
the total North-American quota, lead to higher (lower) internal prices, when the values of 
β  and ξ  are relatively low and the values of L and n are relatively large. Therefore under 
those circumstances, increases (decreases) in the total level of the quota should cause 
increases (decreases) in the profits of the domestic firms. 
 
According to these results it can be demonstrated that the possible effects of a Free Trade 
Agreement between the USA in the Colombian sugar sector are ambiguous, because there 
are two kinds of effects that act in opposed directions: for one side, the impact of the 
increase in the proportion of the quota affecting the Colombian exports: This leads 
unambiguously to increases in the profits of the firms; on the other hand, the effect of 
progressive decreases in the value of the North-American quota, undermine the profits of 
the firms. Which effect can prevail depends on its strength and on the values of the 
parameters in the model.  
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